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Abstract—E-consumers are urged to opt for the best bidding 
strategies to excel in the competitive environment of multiple 
and simultaneous online auctions for same or similar items. It 
becomes very complicated for the bidders to make the 
decisions of selecting which auction to participate in, place 
single or multiple bids, early or late bidding and how much to 
bid. In this paper, we present the design of an autonomous 
dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) that makes these decisions on 
behalf of the buyers according to their bidding behaviors. The 
agent develops a comprehensive methodology for initial price 
estimation and an integrated model for final price prediction. 
The initial price estimation methodology selects an auction to 
participate in and assesses the value (initial price) of the 
auctioned item. Then the final price prediction model forecasts 
the bid amount by designing different bidding strategies using 
fuzzy reasoning techniques. The experimental results 
demonstrated improved initial price prediction outcomes by 
proposing a clustering based approach. Also, the results show 
the proficiency of the fuzzy bidding strategies in terms of their 
success rate and expected utility.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE advent of electronic commerce has dramatically 
advanced the traditional trading mechanism i.e. online 
auctions and has turned up as a powerful tool to alloc te 
goods and resources. In the online auctions’ enterpris , 
traders purchase or sell products by employing specific 
trading rules over the internet supporting different auction 
formats. The common online auction formats are English 
auction; Dutch auction; First-price sealed-bid; and Second-
price sealed-bid [1, 2]. English auctions are the most 
common auction type employed by the online auctioneers in 
eBay, Amazon etc. Bidders participating in this marketplace 
strive for choosing the most favorable bidding strategies to 
win the auction based on their bidding behavior.  Moreover, 
there are multiple auctions where bidders can obtain their 
desired items.  This further complicates the situation of the 
bidders in making decisions of selecting which auction to 
participate in, placing single or multiple bids and how much 
to bid [3, 4].  These hard and time consuming processes of 
analyzing, selecting and making bids and monitoring are 
needed to be automated to assist the buyers while bidding. 
Software agents can promisingly act upon these tasks on 
behalf of the traders. These are the software tools that can 
execute autonomously, communicates with other agents or 
the user and monitors the state of its execution enviro ment 
effectively. These negotiating agents outperform their 
human counterparts because of their systematic appro ch to 
execute complex decision making situations [5, 6]. The 
software agents make decisions on behalf of the consumers 
and endeavor to guarantee the delivery of the item according 
to their bidding behavior.  
eBay style auctions adopt the English auction format with 
an exception to the winning bid [7]. In eBay auctions, a 
bidder with the highest value wins and he pays the second-
highest bid plus one bid increment amount instead of paying 
his own bid. However, the bidders do not bid their maximum 
values either because they have trouble understanding that 
they should bid their maximum value or they have trouble 
simply figuring out what their maximum value is. Closing 
price prediction of the auction can help the bidders in setting 
their maximum valuation of the auctioned item. Furthe more, 
the bidders adjust their bids towards the maximum valuation 
of the item repeatedly in response to the remaining time left 
of the auction and the bids placed by the other participants, 
which leads to the different bidding behaviors. According to 
different bidding behaviors, bidders are categorized as 
evaluators, participators, opportunists, skeptics, snipers, 
unmaskers or shill bidders [8-10]. Moreover, late bidding in 
online auctions has aroused a good deal of attention [11-13]. 
Late bidders appear near to the closing hours of an auction. 
This is a very common behavior by the bidders in an eBay 
style auction with hard closing rules. Late bidding may be 
the best response to a variety of incremental bidding 
strategies because they can better realize the statof he 
auction by observing its historical data. So there is a need to 
design a mechanism which decides the bid amount at a
particular moment in time according to the bidding behavior 
of the late bidders.  
The closing price prediction of an online auction is critical 
because of the dynamic nature of the auction attribu es [14]. 
It depends on the path followed by the price during the 
auction which is known as price dynamics of the auction. 
Different data mining techniques has been used to predict the 
closing price of an auction. Data from a series of the same or 
similar auctions closed in the past has been used to forecast 
the winning bid by exploiting regression, classificat on and 
regression tree, multi-class classification and multiple binary 
classification tasks an auction [15-18]. Also the history of an 
ongoing auction contains significant information and is 
exploited for the short term forecasting of the next bid by 
using support vector machines, functional k-nearest 
neighbor, clustering, regression a d classification techniques 
[14, 16, 19]. However, most of these price prediction 
methods are static that uses information which is avail ble 
only in the beginning of the auction [18, 20]. These cannot 
incorporate price dynamics of auctions for similar tems like 
the models in [21-23]. In addition, price dynamics of 
auctions are different, even when dealing with the auctions 
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of similar items which has a strong influence on the price 
prediction outcomes [24]. So there is a need to characterize 
these auctions based on their price dynamics before 
predicting the closing price of the auction.  
In this article an Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent -
ADBA is developed that uses machine learning and fuzzy 
reasoning techniques for bidding in an environment of 
multiple and simultaneous online auctions of same or 
similar items. This agent assists bidders in making decisions 
by designing bidding strategies as per their different bidding 
behaviors. ADBA selects an auction to participate in and 
assesses the value of the item by adopting a clustering based 
bid mapping and selection approach. The final price of the 
selected auction is predicted by designing bidding strategies 
based on bidding behavior of bidders using Mamdani’s 
Method for fuzzy relations and compositional rule of 
inference [25]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II 
we present the design of the Automated Dynamic Bidding 
Agent. Section III depicts experimental results evaluating the 
performance of the closing price prediction methodol gy and 
the success rate of the bidding strategies designed for 
different bidding behaviors of the bidders. Section IV 
concludes the paper. 
II. AUTOMATED DYNAMIC BIDDING AGENT-ADBA   
The automated dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) is 
represented in Fig. 1. The bidding agent predicts the final 
price of the auction in two phases: phase 1 for the initial 
price estimation and phase 2 for the final price prdiction. 
Phase 1 is responsible for the selection of an ongoing auction 
for participation and assessing the value of the item in the 
selected auction. This assessed value appears as the initial 
price during the second phase of the bidding agent. Phase 2 
utilizes this initial price in order to predict the final price of 
the auction based on different bidding strategies of the 
bidders. 
A. Phase 1: Initial Price Estimation 
The first phase of the ADBA agent estimates the initial 
price of an auction and is formally consists of three steps. 
First, similar auctions are clustered together in k groups 
based on their price dynamics. Second, an auction for 
participation is selected by nominating a cluster for each 
ongoing auction using a bid mapping and selection technique. 
Third, the value of the item in the selected auction s 
assessed using machine learning techniques. 
1) Cluster Analysis: Let ATT be the set of the attributes 
collected for each auction then ATT= {a1, a2….. aj} where j is 
the total number of attributes. Different types of auctions are 
categorized based on some predefined attributes from the 
vast feature space of online auctions. The feature space may 
include average bid amount, average bid rate, number of 
bids, item type, seller reputation, opening bid, closing bid, 
quantity available, type of auction, duration of the auction, 
buyer reputation and many more. In this paper, to classify 
different types of auctions, we focus on only a setof 
attributes; opening bid, closing price, number of bids, 
average bid amount and average bid rate. Now 
ATT={OpenBi, ClosePi, NUMi, AvgBi, AvgBRi},  
where ATT be the set of attributes for an auction 
OpenBi be the opening bid of the i
th auction 
ClosePi be the closing price of the i
th auction 
NUMi be the total number of bids placed in the i
th auction  
AvgBi be the average bid amount of the i
th auction and can 
be calculated as Avg(B1, B2,…..Bl) where B1 is the 1st bid 
amount, B2  is the second bid amount and Bl is the last bid 
amount for the i th auction.  
AvgBRi be the average bid rate of the i
th auction and can be 











11         (1) 
where Bi+1 is the amount of (i+1)
th bid, Bi the amount of i
th 
bid, ti+1 is the time at which  (i+1)
th bid is placed and ti is the 
time at which  ith bid is placed. 
Deciding the value of k in k-means algorithm is a recurrent 
problem in clustering and is a distinct issue from the process 
of actually solving the clustering problem. The optimal 
choice of k is often ambiguous, increasing the value of k 
always reduce the error and increases the computation speed.  
The most favorable method to find k adopts a strategy which 
balances between maximum compression of the data using a 
single cluster, and maximum accuracy by assigning each 
data point to its own cluster. In this paper, the value of k in k-
means algorithm is determined by employing elbow method 
using one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) [26]. 
Once we decide the value of k, k-means clustering 
algorithm is used to partition the similar auctions based on 
their characteristics. Given a set A of N auctions 
A={a1,a2,...aN} where each auction is 5-dimensional real 
vector ATT=[OpenBi, ClosePi, NUMi, AvgBi, AvgBRi] , k-
means clustering aims to partition N auctions into k clusters 
(k<N) in such a way which minimize the within-cluster 
dispersion. The within-cluster dispersion is the sum of 
squared euclidean distances of auctions from their cluster 
centroid [26]. 
2) Bid Mapping and Selection: In order to decide that the 
current ongoing auctions belong to which cluster, the bid 
mapping and selection component is activated. Based on the 
transformed data after clustering and the characteristics of 
the current auctions, it nominates the cluster for each of the 
ongoing auction to select the auction for participation.  
We observe that in 92 of the 149 auctions of our dataset, 
winner first appear in the last hour of the auction, which 
account for the 62% of the total auctions, consistent with the 
late bidding attitude of the bidders recognized in the online 
auction literature [11-13].  Also, clustering has divi ed the 
auction data into the groups of auctions having distinct range 
of average bid rate (AvgBR) values. Furthermore, it has been 
observed that the value of AvgBR in 78% of the completed 
auctions belong to the same cluster as at the beginnin  of the 
last hour of the auction. So a Bid Mapper and Selector 
(BMS) algorithm is proposed for selecting the target auction 
 
 
for participation which maps the ongoing auctions to the 




Fig. 1.  Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent  
Given a set of ongoing auctions OA= OA1 U OA2  
U…….U OAk. where OAi  =[OA i1, OAi2,…….OAin ] , OAi is 
the set of ongoing auctions belonging to the i th cluster , 
i=1,2,….k  where k is the total number  of clusters and  is 
the total number of ongoing auctions belonging to the ith 
cluster, BMS algorithm selects a subset of OA  if  AvgBkn < 
AvgBCk , where AvgBkn is the average bid amount of the n
th 
auction in kth cluster and AvgBCk is the average bid amount 
of the kth cluster.  
The target auction TA is selected which gives maximum 
surplus to the bidders. Surplus is the bidders' returns by 
winning an auction at a price lower than its predicted closing 
price [23].  The auctions with the lower average bid amounts 
are expected to give more surplus to the bidders. So the 
target auction TA is selected for participation with least 
average bid amount in order to maximize the bidders' 
surplus. The developed algorithm is presented in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2.  Bid Mapper and Selector Algorithm (BMS) 
3) Value Assessment:  The value of the auctioned item in 
the target auction is assessed by predicting the closing price 
of the auction. The closing price prediction of the auction 
helps bidders in setting the true value of the item and in turn 
finalizing their maximum valuation of the auctioned item. 
The closing price prediction task is treated by using multiple 
regression technique [26] .  
K ← total number of clusters 
N ← total number of auctions 
Cntk ← counts the number of auctions in the k
th cluster 
AvgBROAi ← average bid rate of the i
th ongoing auction 
MinAvgBRCk ← minimum average bid rate of the 
auctions in the kth cluster 
MaxAvgBRCk ← maximum average bid rate of the 
auctions in the kth cluster 
OAk←set of auctions in the k
th cluster  
AvgBCk ← average bid amount of the auctions in the k
th 
cluster 
TA ← target auction for participation 
AvgBTA ← average bid amount of the target auction 
 
 
AvgBTA ← 0; 
TA← 0; 
for  i ← 1 to N { // Check all the auctions. 
 Cntk ←  0 //Init variable that counts the auctions   
   in a cluster. 
 for k ← 1 to K { // Loop to check all the     
   clusters. 
 
 // Check if the value is in range of the cluster. 
 if ( MinAvgBRCk ≤ AvgBROAi ≤ MaxAvgBRCk ) { 
  OAk  ← OAk U OAi; // Add the auction to 
       the current cluster. 
   Cntk = Cntk +1; // Increment the cnt. 
   if (AvgBOAi ≤  AvgBCk){ //compare with the 
         cluster min. 
 AvgBCk = AvgBOAi; //new cluster min. 
 }//end if 
 
 if(AvgBTA = 0 OR AvgBCk < AvgBTA ) { 
  AvgBTA = AvgBCk; 
  TA = OAi;  // Target auction. 
 }//end if 
 }// end if 
 } // for 1 to K 
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B. Phase 2:Final Price Prediction 
The second phase of the ADBA agent predicts the final
price of the target auction by designing bidding strategies 
for the bidders. These bidding strategies are design d based 
on the output of the first phase for the bidders posessing 
different bidding behaviors. The bidding behaviors which 
depend on both the single or multiple bid placements and 
the time of bid placements are used to determine the various 
types of bidders (Fig. 3). The bidders who place a single bid 
are identified as Mystical and Sturdy bidders. The Mystical 
bidders place a single bid in the closing moments (la t five 
seconds) of the auction and the Sturdy bidders place a single 
bid in the last five minutes of the auction. The bidders who 
place multiple bids in the last hour of the auction are 
identified as Strategic bidders and these bidders increase 
their bid amount strategically, based on the bids placed by 
the other participants. 
 
Fig. 3.  Types of Bidders 
These bidders commonly exhibit two types of behavior: 
firstly, they may be desperate to win the item, andsecondly, 
they may be willing to bargain for that item. The bidders 
exhibiting these behaviors are designated as Ambitious and 
Sophisticated bidders respectively.  
The bidding strategies are designed for the 
aforementioned bidding behaviors of buyers. The purpose of 
designing these bidding strategies is to determine how to 
compute bid amount at a particular moment of time. This 
bid is the maximum value that an agent is willing to pay at 
that particular moment in time. An agent negotiates thi  
value based on bidding characteristics such as auction's 
attributes, bidder's own attitude and other bidder's attitude. 
Auctions’ attributes has been considered while predicting 
the initial price of the auction during the first phase of the 
ADBA agent. Now we compute bid amount at a particular 
moment in time using bidder’s own attitude and other 
bidder’s attitude. We consider main two types of bidder’s 
attitude towards achieving the goal; desperate to get the 
auctioned item (Ambitious bidders) or he has a desire of 
bargain to get the item (Sophisticated bidders).  Ambitious 
bidder starts with higher bids to maximize its chances to win 
the auction, on the other hand, Sophisticated bidder starts 
with lower bids and slowly increments his bids towards its 
maximum willingness to pay near to the closing moments of 
the auction. 
Other bidders’ attitude is used to assess competition n 
the auction by exploiting their previous bids (competing 
bids) in the auction. Bidders update their bids at a particular 
moment in time based on the other's bids [27]. When the 
previous offers placed by other bidders (competing bids) are 
higher and rate of change of bids is higher, the bidder makes 
higher bids with more bid increments to win the auction 
indicating increased competition (Fig 4). In addition, 
remaining duration left till the auction closure is another 
important factor which affects the competition in the 
auction. The bidders make quick decisions towards end of 
the auction due to the time pressure. Time pressure 
increases arousals and the bidders bid beyond their limits as 
end point approaches, when there is little time left [28]. This 
augments the competition amongst auction participants. The 
competition increases as the remaining duration left of 
auction decreases (Fig. 5).  
 
 
Fig. 4.  Competition versus competing bids 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Competition versus remaining duration 
 
The bidding agent models the bid amount based on the 
initial price (pi) and using Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy 
relations and compositional rule of inference for designing 
bidding strategies of buyers [25]. The bid increment for the 
auction is calculated based on the competition in an auction 
and the bidding attitude of different bidding behavior of 
buyers (where bid increment (∆P) is the amount by which 



























competition which depends on remaining duration of the
auction and the previous offers made by other auction 
participants and then bid increment is calculated for
different bidding behavior of bidders. 
1) Competition assessment: Let C is the competition 
having fuzzy set of values as c1,c2,……..cn, D is the 
remaining duration having fuzzy set of values as 
d1,d2,……..dn  and B is the competing bids having fuzzy set 
of values b1,b2,……..bn. According to Mamdani’s Direct 
Method [19] we can find adaptability n no. of rules w1, 
w2,…….wn as follows  
 
w1=µd1(D)  ۷  µb1(B) 
w2=µd2(D)  ۷  µb2(B) 
…………………….. 
wn=µdn(D)  ۷  µbn(B) 
 
Then the competition is assessed for each rule as follows 
 
µc’1 (C) =w1 ۷   µc1 
µc’2 (C) =w2 ۷   µc2 
…………………… 
µc’n (C) =wn ۷   µcn   
 
These rules are aggregated for the final competition 
evaluation 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CncCcCcCc ′∧∧′∧′= µµµµ ......................21  
                       (2) 
Definite value of the competition is found by applying 
center of gravity of the fuzzy set refer to (2) as follows 
 
( ) ( )∫∫= dCCcCdCCcC µµ          (3) 
 
2) Bid determination: Now we calculate the bid 
increment ∆P for the auction based on the attitude and 
assessed competition by applying Mamdani’s Method fr 
fuzzy relations and compositional rule of inference. L t ∆P 
have the fuzzy set values as p1,p2,……..pn, E is the attitudes 
having fuzzy set of values as e1,e2………en and C is the 
competition having fuzzy set of values as c1,c2,……..cn.  
 
Here,  premise 1:  IF c is C and e is E THEN p is ∆P 
   premise2:   c is C’ and e is E’   
   consequence: p is ∆P’ 
 
where C, C’, E, E’, ∆P and ∆P’ are fuzzy sets. As per the 
mechanism of fuzzy reasoning, we infer " p is ∆P’" when 
the condition " c is C’ and e is E’ " is given for the rule " IF 
c is C and e is E THEN p is ∆P".  
Using fuzzy relations approach, we first convert the IF-
THEN rule in premise 1 into the fuzzy relation RC and E → ∆P. 
Then by applying compositional operation, we infer 
conclusion ∆P’ from the fuzzy relations RC and E → ∆P and the 
condition "c is C’ and e is E’" of premise 2 (Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6.  Fuzzy reasoning by using fuzzy relations ad the compositional rule 
of inference 
According to Mamdani’s Method for fuzzy relations and 
compositional rule of inference the rule ei and cj→ pk is 
described by   
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The conversion refer to (4) is based on Cartesian product 













         (5) 
The conversion by using membership value form is 
given as follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )PkpCjcEiePCER ∆∧∧=∆ µµµµ ,,    (6) 
For n number of rules, the compiled fuzzy relation R is 






=∪∪∪=         (7) 
For the input of fuzzy sets E’ on E and C’ on C, the 
output fuzzy set ∆P’ on ∆P can be obtained as follows 
( ) ( ) ( )RECRCERCandEP ooooo ′′=′′=′′=′∆   (8) 
Bid amount for the auction is calculated as  
PipAmountBid ′∆+=_            (9) 
The fuzzy set E' depends on the selected bidding strategy 
for the bidding agent. The ambitious bidders have always 
higher attitude to win the auction than the sophisticated 
bidders because the ambitious bidders are desperate to g t 
the item. Accordingly, the fuzzy set E' is described such that 
E is high for ambitious bidders and low for sophistica ed 
bidders. However, the sophisticated strategic bidders have 
premise-1 
IF c is C and e is E THEN 
p is ∆P 
premise-2 
c is C’ and 
e is E’   
 
consequence 
p is ∆P’ 
fuzzy relation 
  
 RC and E → ∆P 
 
p is ∆P’ 
c is C’ and 




higher attitude to win the auction as compared to the
mystical and sturdy bidders of similar type, so E is also high 
for sophisticated strategic bidders.  
III.  EXPERIMENTS 
The performance of our bidding agent is assessed by 
undertaking an empirical evaluation of the automated 
dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) in two steps. First, the 
methodology for the initial estimation is validated, and 
second, the bidding strategies for different bidding behaviors 
of bidders are evaluated.  
A. Initial Price Estimation 
In the initial price estimation phase, an ongoing auction is 
selected for participation and its closing price is predicted. 
This estimated price acts as the initial price (pi) for designing 
the bidding strategies of bidders. The auction for 
participation is selected based on the bid mapping a d
selecting technique. The closing price of the select d auction 
is predicted by exploiting the clustering based approach [26]. 
In the proposed approach, the closing price of an online 
auction is predicted in two scenarios: first, by exploiting 
multiple linear regressions on whole input auction data, and 
second, by exploiting multiple linear regression on each 
cluster generated by applying the k-means algorithm on 
whole input auction data. The results are evaluated by 
comparing the root mean square errors (RMSEs) in both of 
these scenarios. Experimental results demonstrate fewer 
RMSEs for the prediction results when multiple linear 
regression is applied on each cluster rather than on whole 
input auction data [26].  
B. Evaluating the bidding strategies 
Final price of the target auction is predicted by designing 
bidding strategies for different bidding behavior of the 
bidders using fuzzy reasoning techniques. The bid 
increment (∆P) for the bidders is calculated based on the 
bidding attitude of different bidding behavior of buyers and 
the competition in an auction. The performance of the
bidding agent is compared with the classic model of the 
bidding agent in which the bidding attitude of bidders 
dominates over the competition in an auction while 
calculating the bid increment.  
To compute ∆P, the linguistic variables for the bidder's 
attitude and competition assessment are chosen as discussed 
in section II. The bidding strategies are analyzed by 
considering following set of rules for logic using various 
fuzzy sets. 
 
Rule 1: IF attitude of agent to win the auction is E1 AND 
  competition in the market for that product is C1 
  THEN the bid increment will be P1 
Rule 2: IF attitude of agent to win the auction is E1 AND  
  competition in the market for that product is C2  
  THEN the bid increment will be P2 
Rule 3: IF attitude of agent to win the auction is E2 AND 
  competition in the market for that product is C1 
  THEN the bid increment will be P2 
Rule 4: IF attitude of agent to win the auction is E2 AND 
  competition in the market for that product is C2 
  THEN the bid increment will be P3 
 
These fuzzy sets represent the linguistic variables as 
follows: attitudes low as E1 and high as E2, competition low 
as C1 and high as C2. P1, P2 and P3 are the bid increments 
based on the characteristics of the auction, where P3≥P2≥P1. 
We assume that the set of attitudes for buying any item as 
E=[e1,e2,e3]=[0,0.5,1.0] and set of competition for the good 
in the market as C=[c1,c2,c3]=[0,0.5,1.0]. The fuzzy sets 
used in the preceding four rules can be quantized as shown 
in Fig 7. 
E1=[1.0,0.5,0] C1=[1.0,0.5,0] P1=[1.0,0,0] 
E2=[0,0.5,1.0] C2=[0,0.5,1.0] P2=[0,1.0,0] 




Fig. 7.  Fuzzy Sets for the Bidding Logic 
 
The competition for these bidding strategies is asses ed 
based on the remaining duration left and the bids placed by 
other participants (competing bids). As the bidding 
strategies select bids based on its own attitude as well as on 
the bids placed by the other participants, these strategies 
will be successful when the bidder has a desire to bargain 
behavior. So in this set of experiments, we will discuss the 
performance of Sophisticated agents which act strategically 
based on the bids placed by the other participants.   
For each rule given above, fuzzy relations (R1, R2, R3 
and R4) are constructed using Mamdani's method for fuzzy 
relations and compositional rule of inference. R1 is shown 
as in Fig 8 and the total fuzzy relation R is given as in Fig 9. 
The output fuzzy set ∆P’ on ∆P is calculated for different 
bidding strategies of bidders using input fuzzy sets E’ on E 
and C’ on C by applying Mamdani’s compositional rule of 
Inference for different levels of competition (low and high). 
A definite value of the bid increment is calculated by 
defuzzifying ∆P’ using a center of gravity with the weighted 
































Fig. 9.  Total fuzzy relation R 
The fuzzy bidding strategies are assessed in different 
bidding environments of varying bid rates of auctions. Let 
Bidder1 be the fuzzy bidder agent designed in section II ad 
Bidder2 be the classic model of the bidder agent. These 
bidders with varying bidding strategies compete against one 
another for each type of auction separately. The success rate 
percentage and the expected utility of the bidding agents are 
used as the performance measures. 
 
Success rate percentage = Rsuccess = rsuccess*100 
 
where rsuccess be the success rate and rsuccess = Nwin / Ntotal  ,  
Nwin be the number of auctions won by the agent and Ntotal be 
the total number of auctions. 
 
Expected utility= Uexp = Uwin *  rsuccess 
 
where Uwin be the utility of the winning agents and Uwin =  
(pr-vi)/pr , where pr be the reservation price (maximum 
willingness to pay) and vi be the winning price of the auction. 
Rsuccess and Uexp of Bidder1 and Bidder2 agents with 
different bidding behaviors are averaged over auctions with 
varying bid rates. As can be seen from the Table I, Bidder1 
with mystical, sturdy and strategic behavior outperform the 
classic Bidder2 agents with mystical, sturdy and strategic 
behaviors respectively with respect to the Rsuccess    and Uexp. 
 
TABLE I. 




Success rate %age Expected utility 
Bidder1 Bidder2 Bidder1 Bidder2 
Mystical 41.67 8.33 0.2 0.002 
Sturdy 83.33 8.33 0.51 0 
Strategic 41.67 16.67 0.17 0.002 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented an automated dynamic bidding 
agent (ADBA) using fuzzy reasoning techniques to assist 
bidders in making decisions by designing bidding strategies 
as per their bidding behaviors. The bidding agent primarily 
performs three tasks; first, it decides which auction o bid in, 
secondly, assesses the value of the item in the selcted 
auction, and finally, models the bid amount for a given 
bidding behavior of the bidders. Auction selection and the 
value assessment adopt a clustering based bid mapping and 
selection approach. The ADBA agent forecasts the final 
price of the selected ongoing auction by designing the
bidding strategies based on the bidding behavior of the 
bidders.  Bidding strategies are designed using Mamdani’s 
Method for fuzzy relations and compositional rule of 
inference. The ADBA agent that preserves a balance 
between the bidding attitude of the bidders and the
competition in the auction outperforms the classic model of 
final price prediction in terms of their success rate nd the 
expected utility. Also, the improvement in the error measure 
for each cluster gives support in favor of the proposed 
clustering based bid mapping and selection approach f t e 
value assessment of the item.  
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